It is well recognised that von Neumann's seminal abstraction of machine self-reproduction can be related to the reality of biological self-reproduction -albeit only in very general terms. On the other hand, the most thoroughly studied artificial evolutionary systems, incorporating meaningful selfreproduction, are the coreworld systems such as Tierra, Avida etc.; and these, in general, rely on a purely "self-inspection" mode of reproduction (or, more simply, "replication"). To the extent that the latter has any direct biological analog it would appear to be with molecular level reproduction and evolution in the hypothesised RNA-world. In this paper I review the details and distinctions between these modes of reproduction. I indicate how the abstract von Neumann architecture can, in fact, be readily realised in coreworld systems; and outline the research program that flows from this. Finally I attempt to make more precise the resulting analogies with molecular biology, at least up to the (prokaryotic) cell level.
Background: von Neumann's Problem
As is well known, in the late 1940s and early 1950s John von Neumann conducted an investigation into problems of understanding the evolutionary growth of complexity (Burks, 1966; McMullin, 2000) . In particular, he wondered how it could be possible for a machine, of a given level of complexity, to construct an offspring machine of greater complexity than itself. Prima facie, from an engineering point of view, this seems like a paradox: surely any machine capable of constructing other machines must, in some sense, already contain the design of those machines within itself; and therefore must already be more complex that any such offspring machine. And yet, if the theory of biological evolution (at least of evolutionary descent from one, or a small number, of primordial ancestor species) is correct, and if biological organisms are some (possibly very special) kind of "machine", then this sort of constructive increase in complexity must not just be possible, but must happen repeatedly, indeed almost continuously, over evolutionary time. As a special (edge) case, even without considering evolutionary growth of complexity, viewing organisms as machines at all, and recognising their universal capacity for self-reproduction, implies that essentially arbitrarily complex machines can construct offspring of at least equal complexity to themselves. So, inter alia, von Neumann wondered how it can be that arbitrarily complex machines can be capable of such selfreproduction.
The formulation (and thus solution) of these problems may seem to hinge critically on what we mean by "complexity"; but for the immediate purposes of this paper it will suffice to adopt von Neumann's own, vague and qualitative, definition that complexity means the ability to ". . . do very difficult and involved things" (Burks, 1966, p. 78) . Specifically, the machines under consideration must exist in a universe in which they can "do" more or less "difficult and involved" things, ideally with no obvious upper bound.
With this starting point, von Neumann proceeded to formulate a completely general and abstract machine architecture whereby such machines could:
• be arbitrarily complex (i.e., the set of such machines would span whatever range of complexity is possible at all within their universe),
• be capable of self-reproduction,
• be capable of undergoing spontaneous "mutation", giving rise to offspring which are different in kind, but this difference is retained through further cycles of reproduction -i.e., the differences "breed true",
• and where the entire set of such machines is connected under mutation.
That is, starting with an arbitrarily simple machine having such an architecture, there would exist sequences of possible mutations leading to machines of the highest complexity possible in the particular universe, where all of these machines share the same architecture and all are also capable of self-reproduction. 1 The bare existence of such sequences does not guarantee that any would ever be followed. That would depend on quite separate factors -most critically, what ecological and selectional interactions arise between mutationally distinct machine lineages. However, such questions will fall outside our immediate scope here.
Having formulated the general architecture, von Neumann went on to consider its realisation in particular "model" universes. He first imagined an abstract, but still quite physically motivated, "kinematic automaton" universe -not unlike a modern "physics engine" world such as commonly applied in certain forms of computer gaming and animation. His most detailed elaboration was in the case of a two dimensional, homogeneous, "tesselation automaton", or "cellular automaton" (CA) universe as it would now be called. He did successfully demonstrate, in this particular CA universe, the essential detailed design of a particular "seed" machine that had his abstract architecture (Burks, 1966) . This was sufficient to establish the principle that there could also exist, in this universe, arbitrarily complex machines which would also be logically capable of self-reproduction, and that this entire (infinite) set of selfreproducing machines would be connected under mutation.
The Abstract von Neumann Architecture
The abstract architecture described by von Neumann consists of a complete machine, denoted M , having a highest level decomposition into an active, functional, component, labelled P , and a relatively passive component labelled G. We write M = (P + G).
G consists of a linear chain of sub-components. Each subcomponent can be chosen from some finite set of possible component types. We assume there are at least two such distinct types or configurations. G can be of arbitrary length, and the different component types must be "compatible" in the sense that the chain can be constructed with an arbitrary sequence of these allowed types. G can then be thought of as roughly analogous to the tape of a Turing machine, effectively acting as an information storage system. The particular choice of component at a particular position corresponds to, or represents, the discrete "symbol" recorded in a single "square" of a Turing machine tape. G has no activity or functionality in its own right: it just retains the specific sequence of its components, which is to say, the specific information stored in it.
2 P consists of four distinct, but functional and interacting, "sub-machines" or "sub-assemblies":
A : This is a "general constructive automaton" or "programmable constructor". 3 By hypothesis, A can interpret the information stored in the chain G (in the specific sequence of its sub-components) as representing the 2 As an aside, for our particular purposes here (and unlike a conventional Turing machine tape) it is not essential that each individual "square" of G be capable of being "rewritten" with an arbitrarily different (allowed) symbol. It is sufficient if each position can be made to hold an arbitrary symbol at the time the chain is initially constructed. In this sense, G is more like a "read only memory" than a conventional, Turing tape-style, "read write memory".
3 A is commonly referred to as a "universal constructor". However, that usage is somewhat problematic, and I will avoid it here. description of some essentially arbitrary configuration or assembly of whatever types of machine components are made available in the particular universe. That is to say, A can construct any (largely) arbitrary target (sub-)machine. For the moment we label the latter as X: so we can say that G contains a description of some machine X (relative to A's particular interpretation). We denote this by saying that G stores the information φ(X) or simply G = φ(X) (where the function φ is determined by the detailed design of A). Once activated, A will scan G and proceed to construct an instance of X.
4
B : This is a "general tape copier". Once activated, it will scan G and construct another, separate, chain, with exactly the same sequence of sub-components (i.e., storing the same "information").
C : This is a "controller", which primarily acts to sequence the operations of other sub-assemblies of P . It operates in a cyclical manner. It activates A and B in turn (the order does not matter in general), or possibly even concurrently (provided they will not interfere with each other -in particular in their access to G). It then connects together the two newly constructed sub-assemblies -the sub-machine X and the copy of G -forming (X + G) and releases this into the surrounding environment, as a new, discrete and separate, machine. In general this releasing step is also thought of as incorporating an initial "activation" of the new, offspring, machine. C then starts the cycle again from the beginning, and repeats this indefinitely (for as long as M remains functional or "alive").
D :
This denotes an arbitrary assembly of the components allowed within the universe, i.e., it effectively represents an arbitrary (sub-)machine in its own right, with arbitrary functionality (and thus "complexity") . D can be supposed to operate autonomously of, and indeed concurrently with, the other sub-assemblies, with the one constraint that it must not compromise or interfere with the functionality already described for A, B and C. If necessary, it can be assumed that in addition to sequencing A and B, C also co-ordinates with, or even controls, D to assure this independence of operation. In the general case, this process may "fail" for various reasons. G may not be correctly structured as a "tape" at all (it may have the wrong morphology -not be a linear chain -or have incorporated components not recognised as denoting symbols etc.). There may be configurations for G that are correctly structured (as sequences of symbols) but which do not describe any machine relative to A. There may be possible machines X which A cannot construct (i.e., for which there is no corresponding description (X) relative to A). However, I will not consider these issues further here.
5 von Neumann referred to D as "ancillary" machinery, but this is somewhat misleading. In the general case, D may represent the great bulk of the physical constitution of the overall machine M and, in any case, determines any and all of its distinctive functionality (i.e., over and above self-reproduction per se).
In summary then, a generic behaviour of any machine having this architecture is to repeatedly construct "offspring" machines of the form (X + G), which is to say (X + φ(X)), for arbitrary X. But since X is arbitrary, we can now take the final step of stipulating that X = P . 6 Thus, in designing the machine M we would first design P as already described above and then deliberately arrange that the information recorded into G is just that sequence which, under the function φ(), represents P itself, i.e., G , φ(P ). With this identification, we have M = (P + φ(P )) and the offspring of M is precisely:
i.e., M is now self-reproducing. This is true of the entire family of machines represented by M , having arbitrary (and thus arbitrarily complex) sub-systems ("ancillary machinery") D.
Mutation
As already noted, an essential aspect of von Neumann's problem was that he wanted to understand or model a general mechanism for mutational change, that is, spontaneous or accidental modifications of a (self-reproducing) machine's structure that would nonetheless breed true. With respect to his abstract architecture we will now systematically explore the possibilities.
First consider modifications to the structure of P = A + B + C + D. In the case of changes to any of A, B or C the expected outcome is simply that the reproductive functionality will be broken -the machine will cease to construct any further offspring, or any offspring it does construct will be malformed, probably without function, and certainly no longer identical to the parent. So such changes cannot breed true.
In the case of an alteration to D, say from D to D 0 , then, as long as this does not compromise the ongoing operation of A + B + C, the machine will continue to produce offspring. But since the P part of these offspring is constructed by A interpreting (or "decoding") G = φ(P ), these offspring will revert to the form
and not the altered form
that the parent now has. So again, such changes will not breed true. Now let us consider a modification to the structure of G, changing it to G 0 . In the first instance we now expect that the active machinery of M (P ) will continue in operation, so it will continue to produce offspring. Further, since the B component simply copies whatever chain or information sequence it is presented with, this offspring will contain G 0 rather than G; but this will not be the only difference in the offspring. In general the offspring P part will also be different, as it now results from A decoding G 0 rather than G. Assuming that, relative to A, G 0 codes for any functional machinery at all, we can denote this as P 0 where G 0 = φ(P 0 ). So now the produced offspring have the form
The subsequent behaviour of these offspring -and in particular whether the change will now breed true -will depend on the exact nature of the differences between P and P 0 .
Note that even though (by hypothesis) we are considering only a local ("point") change from G to G 0 , it does not follow that the change from P to P 0 will be similarly localised: this depends entirely on the nature of the decoding function (φ −1 ()) implemented by A. In the general case, P 0 = φ −1 (G 0 ) might be arbitrarily different from P . Nonetheless, for our current purposes we will suppose that the effect is at least approximately local; in particular, let us consider the case where the difference between P and P 0 is localised to just one of the components A, B, C or D.
The simplest case to understand is where only D is affected, changing to D 0 , i.e.,
has exactly the same abstract architecture as the original M and therefore will successfully self-reproduce. Thus, any changes of this sortchanges in G that affect only the D part and function of the offspring -will indeed subsequently breed true. Such changes fully qualify as heritable mutations in the normal biological sense. Further, if it so happens (as it sometimes may) that D 0 is even slightly more complex (more complicated in its behaviour) than D, then this will be an example of an incremental evolutionary growth in machine complexity. Ultimately the entire set of machines of the form
0 are all individually self-reproducing and are fully connected together through this network of possible heritable mutations -spontaneous variations in G that do not affect A, B or C in the offspring.
At this point we can recognise that decomposition of M into P and G is closely analogous to the biological decomposition of an (individual) organism into its phenome and genome respectively. Broadly speaking, modifications to the phenome may or may not impair the ability of the organism to reproduce; but if it can still reproduce then the offspring will not inherit this purely phenotypic change to the parent. Conversely, at least some genotypic changes to the parent will both be expressed in the offspring phenome and subsequently breed true. And indeed if, as previously mentioned, the D component forms the bulk of the machine M , and, correspondingly, the bulk of G codes for D, then we can expect that the bulk of possible changes to G will, if they result in viable offspring at all, fall into this category of giving rise to heritable mutations. Further, we can now recognise the "decoding" function φ −1 , implemented by A, as corresponding to what would be called a genotype-phenotype mapping in biology. For notational convenience below, we will also denote this mapping by , φ −1 .
But let us now return to the final remaining cases of possible machine modifications; namely a change to G to G 0 (i.e., still a "genotypic" change) where this results in a change of (one of) A, B or C in the offspring. At first sight, one is inclined to suppose that the earlier analysis of direct changes to A, B or C in the parent machine can be immediately reapplied to this (first generation) offspring, and conclude that all such mutant offspring will in fact be sterile (so that these cases will also have no evolutionary significance). And indeed, in von Neumann's original presentation that is exactly the position he adopted. However, in fact, this overlooks additional possibilities which do merit deeper consideration. Viable changes to B or C should surely not be absolutely ruled out; but for our particular purposes here we will choose to focus specifically on the role of changes localised to subsystem A, the programmable constructor.
Let us consider then the behaviour of a first generation offspring machine of the form In this case the outcome depends critically on the detailed behaviour of this modified decoding function; indeed, it depends on the behaviour of this function precisely for the particular element of its domain represented by G 0 = φ(A 0 + B+C+D). Probably the most common case will be that this decodes as some arbitrary
No general further analysis of that case is possible, but we can reasonably expect that that (second generation) offspring will be largely or wholly non-functional i.e., we again conclude that M 0 is sterile.
But there is still the logical possibility that, even though 6 = 0 (by hypothesis) we might still have
e., for that particular G 0 the two functions might still co-incide. We would say that 0 (or A 0 ) is backwards compatible with (or A) for that particular value of their common domain. In that (special, but conceivable) case, the machine M 0 can be equally well represented as having the structure
. By the logic of the abstract architecture, this is indeed self-reproducing, so we again have an example of a heritable mutation; but of a quite different order to the "normal" case of a simple change affecting D 0 . In fact, this would correspond to a mutation in the genotype-phenotype mapping itself. In one mutational step, we would have moved from exploring the space of machines M = (A + B + C + D) + φ(A + B + C + D), with arbitrary D and all sharing a common genotype-phenotype map defined by A, to exploring a different space of machines
, still with arbitrary D, but now sharing a different genotype-phenotype map 0 . This may not seem like a big change at first sight -as the space of machines D, which putatively defines all of the "interesting" variation in complexity, may still be essentially identical in both cases. But, the topology of the mutational connections -and thus the dynamics of evolutionary change, and the ultimate complexity which emerges -may be radically different.
The very least we might conclude is that any system that has this possibility for evolutionary modification of the genotype-phenotype map has, at the very least, some additional degrees of evolutionary freedom that would not otherwise be available. This will depend, of course, on the space of "possible" decoding functions () and on the subset of these that might be mutationally accessible from any particular starting point (the particular () implemented by some particular, initial, seed, machine). It seems very difficult to make any general statement about this; but one particular case would be where the potential machinery represented by A is capable of incorporating, as part of the decoding process, any arbitrary Turing computation (i.e., the available configurations for A encompass the flexibility of universal computation). This would at least guarantee that the space of possible genotype-phenotype mappings (and corresponding evolutionary dynamics) spans a very wide range of possibilities. However, even this still leaves completely open the question of how richly connected this mutational space might be; i.e., how common would be the "backwards compatible" mutations that actually allow to successfully mutate?
Finally for this discussion we should note again that this possibility of a mutable genotype-phenotype mapping relies on a peculiarly tangled loop of inter-dependency. For selfreproduction to work in von Neumann's architecture, the programmable constructor (A) must always be described or encoded into the genome under a mapping (φ()) which precisely inverts the mapping that that constructor itself physically realises ( ()), at least for that one particular description represented by genome G. Howard Pattee in particular has especially drawn attention to this aspect of von Neumann's architecture, and distinguished it with the term semantic closure (Pattee, 1982) .
Self-Reproduction in Coreworlds
As noted, the most detailed proposal for an artificial realisation of the von Neumann self-reproduction architecture was in his two dimensional CA universe. Von Neumann himself, having set aside this work in the form of a planned, but unfinished manuscript, did not have the opportunity to return to it before his untimely death in 1957. In any case, the detail and required scale of the model was such that it is only very recently that it has become technically feasible to build a practical implementation 7 . More importantly, and quite independently of scaling issues, that particular realisation was never expected or intended to support investigation of any substantive evolutionary processes, because the machines are intrinsically fragile with no ability to interact (even with their own offspring) without causing catastrophic breakdown in organisation (McMullin, 2000) .
By contrast, so-called coreworld systems do allow practical investigation of relatively large populations of selfreproducing agents over sufficient time to allow significant evolutionary change. These agents can be conceived as as small machine code programs, each occupying a block of allocated memory and executed by a dedicated processor (CPU). Memory blocks and CPUs are managed and allocated from a common pool.
The roots of the coreworld concept can be traced back to Nils Barricelli, who was invited to visit the Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) in Princeton by von Neumann in the early 1950s (Barricelli, 1957) . 8 However, the more recent and most extensively studied systems of this type are Tierra (Ray, 1992 (Ray, , 1994 and Avida (Adami and Brown, 1994; Adami, 1998) .
While these systems do involve self-reproduction of a sort, to date this has not been implemented using the von Neumann architecture. Instead, reproduction is achieved by direct "self-inspection".
9 That is, these universes are designed in such a way that machines (realised as software agents or processes) of arbitrary complexity (within the context of the particular universe) can successfully examine their own detailed internal structure (their own memory image) without disruption; and can copy this structure into a newly allocated memory block, allocate a separate CPU, and then release an essentially identical offspring machine into the (shared) environment. In terms of the von Neumann architecture it is as if the G and P components are com-7 It is reported that ". . . in 2008, the hashlife algorithm was extended to support the 29-state and 32-state rulesets . . . [and] On a modern desktop PC, replication now takes only a few minutes" (Wikipedia contributors, 2012). 8 Barricelli actually did his earliest work of this type on the "IAS Machine", the stored programme electronic digital computer built at Princeton to von Neumann's original design and under his direction. 9 We focus here on coreworld systems; but note that the selfinspection mechanism has been proposed in other frameworks also (e.g., Laing, 1977; Morita and Imai, 1996) . bined in one single, active, structure which also serves as its own description; accordingly, it need only be copiedno "decoding" step is needed as the copied structure is already directly constructed in the required "functional" form. But viewed as P we can still decompose it into a part concerned with self-inspection/copying (corresponding to von Neumann's B) and a part corresponding to all machinery not directly concerned with reproduction (von Neumann's D). There is no A or C, and no separate G. Instead, we have just G ⌘ P = (B + D) Heritable mutations are still perfectly possible. Any modification anywhere in the memory image which does not impair the inspection (reproduction) functionality (i.e., almost any change to part D, and typically at least some changes to part A) will result in an offspring which is still capable of self-reproduction, preserving that modification -i.e., the modified/mutated machine will breed true.
Accordingly, in this architecture there is no decomposition into a separate "phenome" and "genome". In effect, the whole machine (or at least its tape/memory image) is simultaneously both phenome and genome.
Despite this seemingly radical simplification, a family of such self-inspectors (defined by a specific B and arbitrary D) still meets all the desiderata to address von Neumann's problem as it was expressed earlier.
Now this kind of pure self-inspection architecture need not be feasible in general. Thus, in von Neumann's own CA based model universe, it is not possible for an arbitrary machine to completely inspect its own internal structure without disruption -it would effectively have to disassemble (i.e., destroy) itself in the process. Similarly, in the physicalchemical world of real biology, there are serious limitations to the possibilities for self-inspection. In such universes, the von Neumann architecture, with its separation of the functional, dynamic, phenome from a static, linear (completely open to non-destructive inspection) genome clearly enables a qualitatively richer set of self-reproducing machine configurations, and thus a qualitatively richer potential for evolutionary exploration. But conversely, in universes such as coreworlds, which have been specifically engineered to support comprehensive, non-destructive, inspection of arbitrary machine configurations, it would seem that all conceivable evolutionary phenomenology must already be available via machines with the self-inspection architecture; so even if machines with the full von Neumann architecture could be realised in such universes, there would arguably be no point or interest in doing so.
Nonetheless, there are grounds for suggesting that this issue should not yet be completely closed. In particular, note that if we restrict attention to self-inspectors, not only is there no decomposition into genome (G) and phenome (P ); there is also no property of semantic closure (in Pattee's sense) and no mutable mapping from genotype space to phenotype space. Given the discussion of the previous section we would like to hold open at least the possibility that even though the von Neumann architecture is not necessary for "general purpose" self-reproduction in coreworlds, nonetheless it may be useful; it may give rise to evolutionary dynamics and phenomenology (including exploration or complexification of the genotype-phenotype mapping) that would not otherwise arise.
So, can we say whether it is possible in principle to embed agents having the von Neumann architecture in coreworld systems?
The general, in principle, answer is "yes". A coreworld already provides facilities for a machine (software agent) to allocate an additional memory block, configure it (write into it) as desired, allocate a CPU to start execution on that memory block, and release this functioning assembly into the environment as a separate, autonomous, agent. As it is possible for an agent to inspect and copy its entire memory image into the offspring memory block, then it should surely be possibly to copy only some part of the image (to be identified as G). The remaining part of the offspring can be separately populated by executing a more or less arbitrary "decoding" process on the content of G. Assuming the coreworld instruction set is Turing complete this decoding can, in principle, involve any arbitrary Turing computation. 10 The P part of the agent is the only part that is directly executed during this process; and it will decompose straightforwardly into program sections having the functionality of the von Neumann components A, B and C; any remaining part of P , which is functional and allows the agent to perform behaviours unrelated to reproduction, will correspond to von Neumann's D.
Experimental investigation of the implementation and evolutionary behaviour of such agents is currently underway in both Tierra and Avida. For my immediate purposes here I simply mention some of the specific questions to be studied:
• How frequently are viable mutations of the genotypephenotype map ( ()) observed? How does this vary with the specific initial choice of map?
• Is the structure of the von Neumann architecture (the decomposition of M into G + P , and the further decomposition of P into A + B + C + D) stable under evolution? Or do the roles of these components become blurred?
• More particularly, can the reproduction architecture revert back to simple self-inspection? 10 In the case of Tierra, Turing completeness was originally demonstrated by Maley (1994) , albeit it turned out to be extremely clumsy due to the lack of instructions to directly move data between memory and CPU registers. A similar limitation affects the default configuration of Avida. However, in both cases it is straightforward to enable additional instructions to remove these limitations.
• To the extent that the reproduction architecture does not revert back to self-inspection, does the seeding with a von Neumann ancestor alter the typical evolutionary dynamics of these systems? For example, does the typical parasite (hyperparasite etc.) phenomena of Tierra still occur?
Minimal Biological Self-Reproduction
Having now articulated the two clearly distinct abstract approaches to self-reproduction -the von Neumann indirect, genotype-phenotype architecture, and the approach of comprehensive self-inspection and inspection -let us consider in more detail the relation between these and biological selfreproduction. I will focus on primitive, minimal, forms of biological self-reproduction on the basis that these give the best possibility of identifying analogues to these abstract mechanisms. Von Neumann's work was presumably grounded in some prior biological knowledge -including the conceptual distinction between genotype and phenotype, the known fact that the genotype had a material basis in the chromosome(s), and that it admitted of some degree of linear decomposition in the form of linkage maps among discrete, heritable, "genes". He was likely also aware of Schrödinger's specific suggestion that the chromosomes involved some kind of "aperiodic crystal" structure (Schrödinger, 1944) . However, von Neumann still devised his abstract architecture around five years 11 before the detailed molecular structure of DNA was first identified (Watson and Crick, 1953) . It was striking then that DNA turned out to be a polymer with a linear primary structure, where there are four distinct possible monomers that can be used at each position, in arbitrary sequence, while still being compatible with the overall structure. Further, during (cellular) reproduction, this sequence is precisely copied to a separate DNA molecule that is distributed to the offspring. Subsequent work in molecular biology demonstrated further that there exists active molecular machinery which can "decode" ("translate") the information sequence from the DNA to produce all the key functional and structural components of the cell, primarily in the form of proteins. In particular, there is a very well defined (and almost universal) coding between DNA sequence and protein sequence, which is prima facie strongly reminiscent of the () mapping in the von Neumann architecture.
In more detail then, it is possible to identify specific molecular analogues of several elements of von Neumann's architecture:
• G: Corresponds to DNA; in the case of bacteria, literally a single DNA chromosome.
• P : All the active molecular machinery, coded for by the DNA genome. Largely made up of structural and functional proteins. These can be partially refined as:
isted at least some these RNAs with the ability to function as RNA-polymerases (ribozyme RNA-replicases). Since these would then be able to make copies of themselves, it would seem that these would be quite precisely analogous to coreworld self-inspectors. Admittedly, this would still be somewhat hypothetical: no such general purpose ribozyme RNA-replicases have been identified to date. But more importantly, even here, there is still one crucial dis-analogy. Even if ribozyme RNA-replicases are possible, it is not supposed that one individual molecular could literally function to replicate its own sequence. Rather, it is assumed that it could replicate the sequence of another already existing copy of itself. This may seem like a minor detail; but in fact the selectional dynamics of such systems would be very different indeed (showing hyperbolic rather than exponential growth, and a typical phenomenon not of Darwinian "survival of the fittest", but "survival of the most common"). Consequently, the resulting evolutionary phenomena would also be expected to be very different indeed from anything normally occurring in coreworld systems.
Conclusion
This paper has set out to review and compare the two "canonical" forms of machine self-reproduction that have been proposed in the field of Artificial Life. Of these, the simpler, self-inspection, mechanism has been fully realised in the so-called coreworld systems, and the resulting evolutionary dynamics have been the subject of extensive experimental investigations. The other, the von Neumann architecture, has largely been studied in the context of cellular automaton universes. It has only recently been realised in any practical experimental system; and only in forms where, quite aside from very high computational demands, significant evolutionary dynamics are impossible even in principle due to the intrinsic fragility of the reproducing agents. It has been pointed out, nonetheless, that there are grounds for supposing that the von Neumann architecture may facilitate certain kinds of evolutionary exploration that are not possible at all in systems based exclusively on self-inspectors; and that moreover, while both these forms of self-reproduction are very abstract compared to any real biological reproducers (or even hypothetical ones such as the replicating molecules of the RNA-world), the von Neumann architecture does admit significantly more and deeper points of analogy with real molecular biology than self-inspectors do. An outline has been given of how von Neumann architecture reproducers could, in fact, be realised in coreworld systems; and some specific questions have been formulated for study in such a research program.
